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The proposed Commercial Code, is now reaching the final
stages of redrafting before approval and promulgation. It is
the purpose of this paper to discuss Article 3 of the proposed
code, which constitutes the negotiable instruments section.
2
The question arises at the outset, why a new Uniform Com-
mercial Code, and why a complete rewriting of familiar lan-
guage? The need for uniform legislation governing commer-
cial transactions has been long felt.8 The question at issue
was one of policy, and the drafters reasoned that it would be
easier to persuade legislators to enact one statute than to
amend and re-enact several. Furthermore, a single statute
would enable the draftsmen to integrate and organize their
material, and ccmercial law appears to have been a unit
that lent itself readily to such treatment. The rewriting was
necessary to avoid perpetuating errors and conflicts of the
past; and in addition it gave the draftsmen their opportunity
to create a statute that had meaning to laymen as well as to
skilled technicians.
While many lawyers will feel that settled law is thus to be
unsettled, there is much to be said for the new code. The fear
that it will require hours of additional study and dAngers
of mistaken interpretation commonly to be associated with
the reading of a new statute does not appear well founded.
Although arbitrary choices between conflicting rules of law
had to be made, the drafters attempted to exhaust legal, com-
mercial, and business sources before making an election. To
* Professor of Law, University of North Dakota.
1 All references are to the Uniform Commercial Code, Proposed Final Draft,
Spring, 1950, as submitted by the Council of the American Law Institute for
discussion at the twenty-seventh annual meeting of the American Law Institute
in joint session with the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, May
18, 19, and 20, 1950.
2 The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law was promulgated in 1896. Five
states adopted the statute in 1897, and the last adoption occurred in 1924.
8 For a recent discussion on uniform laws see Rossman, Uniformity of Law:
An Eluive Goal, 36 A.B.A.J. 175 (March, 1950); Chnader, Tho New Commercial
Code: Modernix-ing Our Uniform Commercial Acts, 36 A.B.A.J. 179 (March,
1950).
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give the courts a new start on uniformity of construction, the
Code states expressly in the opening section that it "is reme-
dial and shall be liberally construed an4 applied to promote
its underlying reasons, purposes and policies . . . On the
other hand, one of the reasons for varying rules under existing
uniform acts has been the failure of the courts to distinguish
between presumptions created by statute and mandatory rules.
The present act makes its provisions mandatory except where
the rule is qualified by the words "unless otherwise agreed." 5
Finally, each section is followed by annotations, designated
"Official Comments," which the drafters intended to serve as
a guide in construing the statute.8 Each comment indicates
changes made in existing law, if any, with reference to the
statute amended, and a discussion of any change or new ma-
terial added.
The first striking impression of Article 3 7 is its compact-
ness. Thus the new code devotes only 79 sections to negotiable
instruments, as compared to 198 sections in the N.I.L. The
reason for this condensation lies in the careful integration of
related sections, widely dispersed in the original statute, and
the deletion of obsolete provisions. Yet, surprisingly enough,
many of the sections cover new material.
In accordance with sound practice in draftsmanship, Ar-
ticle 3 opens with a short title section " and a section on
definitions. Users will find the definition section valuable as
a descriptive word index leading into the body of the statute.
Among other terms, the word "issue" is redefined in this
section," and now permits issue of the instrument to a re-
mitter. The N.I.L. contains no section dealing directly with
the rights of one who purchases an instrument but is not
named as a party. Clearly he is an owner, but whether or not
he is a holder entitled to recover on the instrument in his own
4 U.C.C. 1-102 (Spring, 1950).
5Id. §1-107.
6 "The Official Commenta of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute may be consulted by the
courts to determine the underlying reasons, purposes and policies of this Act
and may be used as a guide in its construction and application." U.C.C.
§1-102 (2).
7 To conserve space the present uniform act will be referred to as the "N.I.L."
while the proposed code will be referred to as "U.C.C." Where Article 3 of the
Uniform Commercial Code is referred to'it will be cited simply as "Article 3."
8 "This Article shall be known and may be cited as Uniform Commercial Code
- Commercial Paper." U.C.C. §3-101.
9" 'Issue' means the first delivery of an instrument to a holder or remitter."
U.C.C. §3-102 (c).
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name under §51 of the N.I.L. 10 is in doubt because the present
definition of "issue" requires delivery of a complete instru-
ment to one who takes as a holder.- In turn, "holder" has been
defined as including only the "payee or endorsee" in possession
of the instrument. 12 The result is that the case must be treated
as one not provided for under the statute and a recovery al-
lowed on common law principles.'- Another difficulty arising
under the present definition of "issue" stems from the require-
ment that the instrument must be complete when issued.
Clearly rights do arise when incomplete instruments are
delivered," and. Article 3 accordingly eliminates the require-
ment that a complete instrument be delivered.
The words "order" and "promise" are also defined in this
section.' 5 These definitions taken together with the omission
of §10 of the N.I.L. make it clear that the language used
must clearly express an order or promise. Doubts are to be
resolved against negotiability unless the language used is a
clear equivalent. Thus the comment indicates that "I under-
take" is the equivalent of "I promise," and "Pay to Holder"
creates an order instrument. 17 The definition of order permits
naming of alternative drawees, expressly denied in §128 of
the N.I.L. i" The reason suggested is the convenience of nam-
ing drawees in different parts of the country. A presentment
to any one of the named drawees is sufficient to bring later sec-
tions on presentment and dishonor into application. Succes-
sive drawees are not permitted because the holder should
be entitled to treat the instrument as dishonored after the
first presentment.
20 N.D. Rev. Code 145-0501 (1943).
"1 N.I.L. §41-0102 (1943).
12 lbid.
is Britton, Bills and Notes §75 (1943); Brannon, Negotiable Instruments Law
655 et seq. (7th ed. 1948); Comment, 28 Yale L. J. 695 (1919); Moore, The
Right of a Remitter of a Bill or Note, 20 Col. L. Rev. 749 (1920); Beutel, Rights
of Remitter and Other Owners not Within the Tenor of Negotiable Instruments,
12 Minn. L. Rev. 584 (1928).
"4 See N.I.L. §14, 16, N. D. Rev. Code §141-0214, 41-0216 (1943).
15 "An 'order' is a clearly expressed direction to pay and must be more than
a mere authorization or request. It must identify the drawee with reasonable
certainty. It may be addressed to a single drawee or to drawees jointly or in
the alternative but not in succession." U.C.C. §3-102 (d).
"A 'promise' is s9 clearly expressed undertaking to pay and must be more
than a mere acknowledgment of an obligation." U.C.C. §3-102 (e).
1e "The instrument need not follow the language of this title, but any terms
are sufficient which clearly indicate an intention to conform to the requirements
hereof." N.D. Rev. Code §41-0210 (1943).
17 Comment, U.C.C. §3-104.
18 N.D. Rev. Code §41-1003 (1943).
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SCOPE OF ARTICLE 3
Article 3 expressly excludes money, documents of title, and
investment securities. 19 It is limited strictly to commercial
paper, but goes a step further than the N.I.L. by including
commercial paper conforming to the statute in all respects, al-
though not payable to order or to bearer.20 Thus a check pay-
able to John Doe is included within the scope of the act, al-
though no one can be a holder in due course. Such an instru-
ment is treated as a mercantile specialty in that it passes by
indorsement and delivery. The present act makes it clear
that this instrument is covered by its terms in relation to in-
dorsement, consideration, burden of proof and other matters
aside from holder in due course. Such an instrument is not
a simple contract as would be true of a note containing a
clause making it conditional.
FORM OF NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
The prerequisites of a negotiable instrument as set out in
the N.I.L. have given rise to conflicting interpretations as to
its scope.2 1 One question that has troubled the courts under
the N.I.L. arises from an ambiguity in the opening sentence of
§1: "An instrument to be negotiable must conform to the fol-
lowing requirements. .. " 22 The implication is that the act cov-
ers all instruments, an unfortunate result in that it led courts
in some ,instances to refuse limited negotiability to order in-
struments dealt in on investment markets, 23 and on the other
19 U.C.C. §3-103.
20"This Article applies to any instrument whose terms do not preclude
transfer and which is otherwise negotiable within this Article but which is
not payable to order or to bearer, except that there can be no holder in due
course of such an instrument." U.C.C. §3-705.
21 N.I.L. §65, N.D. Rev. Code §41-0606 (1943), concludes: "The provisions
of subdivision three of the section do not apply to persons negotiating public or
corporate securities, other than bills and notes."
The implication is that to be negotiable an instrument must comply with the
N.I.L. whether or not it is a bill or a note. It is obvious that a limited negoti-
ability making for free transferability is an essential element in instruments
dealt in on a commodities market. On the other hand, the question of cutting
off defenses of the maker must be determined by policies related to the function
of the instrument. For an excellent discussion on this point see Leary, Some
Clarifications in the Law of Commercial Paper Under the Proposed Uniform
Commercial Code, 97 ,U of Pa.L.Rev. 354, 355 et seq. (1949).
22 N.D. Rev. Code §41-0201 (1943).
23 In Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 242 N.Y. 38, 150 N.E. 594 (1926), the N.I.L.
was applied to interim certificates; in King Cattle Co. v. Joseph, 158 Minn.
481, 198 N.W. 798 (1924), the statute was applied to corporate bonds; and in
Manker v. American Savings Bank and Trust Co., 131 Wash. 430, 230 Pac. 406
(1924), it was applied to municipal bonds. In all three of these cases the rights
of a subsequent bona fide purchaser were defeated because the instrument did
not meet the requirements of the Act.
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hand to uphold instruments in the nature of conditional sales
and chattel mortgages although thinly disguised as promissory
notes.2 ' Article 3 avoids these difficulties by expressly exclud-
ing from coverage investment securities and any writing re-
serving security rights, and makes it clear that the article
applies only to commercial paper by specifying the four types
of commercial paper covered.
25
WHEN PROMISE OR ORDER UNCONDITIONAL
Section 3 of the N.I.L. concludes: "But an order or promise
to pay out of a particular fund is not unconditional." 26 Article
.3 introduces two important exceptions to this general prin-
ciple. 27 The Code expressly makes negotiable order paper
issued by governmental agencies, although payable out of a
specific fund. Problems of the same nature have arisen in re-
gard to trust estates and unincorporated associations. 28 Under
this section, a promise remains unconditional although it is
"limited to payment out of the entire assets of a partnership,
unincorporated association, trust or estate by or on behalf of
which the instrument is issued." 29 The question of individual
liability remains a subject of state law aside from Article 3;
the act purports to deal only with the question of negotiability.
This section expressly negatives the effect of constructive
and implied conditions arising from recitals relating to the.
24 For an illustration of a conditional sales contract successfully incorporated
in a promissory note without destroying negotiability, see Abingdon Bank &
Trust Co. v. Shipplett-Moloney Co., 316 I1. App. 79, 43 N.E.2d 857 (1942).
Contra: Fleming v. Sherwood, 24 N.D. 144, 139 N.W. 101 (1912) eemble.
23 "A writing which complies with the requirements of this section is
(a) a 'draft' if it is an order;
(b) a 'check' if it is a draft drawn on a bank and payable on demand;
(c) a 'certificate of deposit' if it is an acknowledgment by a bank or
other depository of receipt of money engaging to repay it;
(d) a 'note' if it is a promise other than a certificate of deposit.
"A writing which purports to create or reserve security rights does not fall
within this Article, even though it also contains a promise to pay money."
U.C.C. §3-104 (2) and (3).
26 N.D. Rev. Code 341-0203 (1943).
27 "A promise or order otherwise unconditional is not made conditional by the
fact that the instrument...
(f) is limited to payment out of a particular fund or the proceeds of
a particular source, if the instrument is issued by a government
or governmental agency or unit; or
(g) is limited to payment out of the entire assets of a partnership,
unincorporated association, trust or estate by or on behalf of
which the instrument is issued." U.C.C. 93-105.
28 Note the fact situation in Vorachek v. Anderson, 54 N.D. 891, 211 N.W. 984
(1927). Under the proposed act it now becomes feasible to limit the holder to
recovery against the assets of a voluntary association.
29 See note 27 supra.
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consideration giving rise to the instrument, and makes more
definite the rule that such recitals in no way qualify the
duty to pay. Thus a statement "that the promise or order is
made or the instrument matures in accordance with or 'as
per' such transaction; . . ." is treated as a mere recital of
the consideration." A reference to security or reservation of
title receives similar treatment.3 1 Here a distinction is to be
noted between an instrument that creates a security interest
and one that merely refers to the fact that it is secured. The
first type is expressly excluded from the Code.82 The purport
of the section is that an instrument is negotiable where the
holder can ascertain all its essential terms from an examina-
tion of its face. If he is compelled to go outside the instrument
by its express terms, it is not negotiable. 83
SUM CERTAIN
Article 3 makes several important changes in §2 of the
N.I.L.3 4 The original act contained no provisions covering
many common practices relating to interest, exchange, and
costs of collection on default. Under the proposed section the
practices of providing for different rates of interest before
and after default, or allowing discounts for payment in ad-
vance, or additions if not paid at maturity, are recognized and
provided for. The section recognizes varying practices in re-
gard to exchange. Exchange may be either added or sub-
tracted without affecting certainty of the sum payable.35 Two
important extensions of the original section relate to costs
of collection, and acceleration and extension clauses. The N.I.L.
3oU.C.C. 13-105 (b).
31 U.C.C. §3-105 (d).
32 See note 25 supra.
33 The hope of the drafters is that negotiable instruments will become
"courier(s) without luggage."
34 "(1) The sum payable is a sum certain even though it is to be paid
(a) with stated interest or by stated installments; or
(b) with stated different rates of interest before and after default or
a specified date; or
(c) with a stated discount or addition if paid before or after the date
fixed for payment; or
(d) with exchange or less exchange, whether at a fixed rate or at the
current rate; or
(e) with costs of collection or an attorney's fee, or both upon default;
or
(f) upon acceleration or after extension.
"(2) Nothing in this section shall validate any term which is otherwise
illegal." U.C.C. §3-106.
35 The test of certainty is simply whether the holder at any maturity date
can compute the sum due by reference to information given on the face of the
instrument.
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limited the addition of costs of collection and an attorney's fee
to default at maturity. The present section covers all defaults.
Similarly, where the N.I.L. limits acceleration to the case of
defaults in installments of principal or interest, the proposed
act not only permits all types of acceleration, but also includes
extensions."e
It is to be noted that no amendment of this section will be
necessary to make it conform to North Dakota policy. The
act relates only to the effect of such clauses on negotiability of
the instrument.87
MONEY
Money is not defined in the N.I.L. The only reference to
money in that act is found in §6 (5) and that refers to "cur-
rent money." al The problem has several aspects. Is an instru-
ment negotiable when payable in a particular kind of current
money not recognized as legal tender? 39 Would such an instru-
ment be negotiable if the medium of exchange were current
only in a particular community? 40 Is an instrument payable
in foreign money negotiable? ,1 Would such an instrument be
negotiable if made payable in the United States in foreign
money?
The Code gives a definite answer to these questions for the
first time. First, it requires that the instrument be payable in
a medium recognized as part of the currency at the time the
instrument is made.42 This rejects the view that money is
limited to legal tender, or that money includes a medium of
36 Discussed infra, under "Definite Time."
37 North Dakota policy is opposed to allowance of an attorney's fee. N.D.
Rev. Code 1§28-2604, 41-0202 (5) (1943). A loan contract may not provide for
a higher rate of interest after default, N.D. Rev. Code §47-1405 (1943). However,
interest may be deducted in advance, N.D. Rev. Code §47-1408 (1943), but com-
pounding of interest is prohibited. N.D. Rev. Code §47-1409 (1943).
8s N.D. Rev. Code §41-0206 (5) (1943).
39 That an instrument payable in "currency" is negotiable, see Merchants
National Bank v. Santa Maria Sugar Co., 162 App. Div. 248, 147 N.Y. Supp. 498
(1914). Contra: First State Bank v. Hidalgo Land Co., 268 S.W. 144 (Tex. Com.
App. 1925), reversing, 257 S.W. 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
40 U.C.C. §1-201 (23) provides: "'Money' means a medium of exchange auth-
orized or adopted by a domestic or foreign government as a part of its currency."
41 The authorities are reviewed in Incitti v. Ferrante, 12 N.J. Misc. 840, 175
Atl. 908 (1933). The case held that a note payable in "15,400 Italian lires"
was negotiable, and if payable in this country was payable in American money
at the current rate of exchange.
42 See note 40 supra.
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exchange acceptable in a particular community.4 - The test is
governmental sanction.
Second, an instrument payable in currency or current funds
is payable in money under the test set out above.4
Third, the Code recognizes that instruments payable in
foreign money are payable in American money at the current
rate of exchange unless the parties specifically provide that
it shall be payable in foreign money in the United States. The




Article 3 omits the concluding sentence of § 7 of the N.I.L. 6
"Where an instrument is issued, accepted, or indorsed when
overdue, it is, as regards the person so issuing, accepting, or
indorsing it, payable on demand." The language is confusing
and misleading. It implies that paper reissued when overdue
takes on new life.4 7 But under §53 of the N.I.L.4 8 one must
take within a reasonable length of time after issue to be a
holder in due course of demand paper, and "issue" means the
first delivery of the instrument.40 The only purpose of the
section was to indicate that the drawer and indorser of -over-
due paper was entitled to the same presentment and notice as
in the case of demand paper.50 The topic properly belonged in
another section, and hence it is treated under the section on
presentment.
The section clarifies the question of at what point interest
begins to run on a demand instrument where no specific
provision for interest is made. The drafters took the view
that it should not run until demand is made unless the instru-
ment provides otherwise. The reason suggested is that no de-
fault occurs until demand.
43 The weight of authority is in accord. However, some states in the early 1800's
made instruments payable in certain types of personal property negotiable. Brit-
ton, Bills and Notes 119 n.1 (1943).
44 See note 39 supra. This settles a dispute and is in accord with the better
view.
45 See note 40 supra.
4. N.D. Rev. Code §41-0207 (1943).
47 In Idaho State Bank of Twin Falls v. Hooper Sugar Co., 74 Utah 24, 276
Pac. 659 (1929), a bona fide pledgee of an instrument indorsed after maturity
was held to be a holder in due course.
48 N.D. Rev. Code §41-0503 (1943).
49 N.I.L. §191, N.D. Rev. Code §41-0102 (1943).
50 Torgerson v. Ohnstad, 149 Minn. 46, 182 N.W. 724 (1921); Morgan v. Hoff-
man, 76 Mont. 396, 247 Pac. 326 (1926); Nees v. Hagan, 22 Tenn. App. 78, 118
S.W.2d 566 (1938).
NORTH DAKOTA BAR BRIEFS
DEFINITE TIME
This section adopts the language "definite time" in lieu of
"determinable future time," and reverses the rule of §4(3)
of the N.I.L. 51 If the time of payment can be determined from
the face of the instrument it is payable at a definite time, and
hence the more exact language was deemed preferable. A
note payable one year after the death of the maker, or one
year after the war is over will no longer be negotiable. This
was a wise change since such paper would not be acceptable
in general commerce because of the uncertainty of maturity -
hence defenses of the maker are now preserved. The comment
points out that an undated note payable 30 days after date
would be an incomplete instrument and could be filled up and
enforced.
The problems raised by acceleration and extension clauses
are directly dealt with in this section. Three types of accelera-
tion clauses may exist. The instrument may be subject to ac-
celeration (1) at the option of the maker, 52 (2) at the option
of the holder,53 or (3) automatically on a specified act or
event.54
Type one is usually an "on or before" instrument and was
negotiable at common law and under the N.I.L. Type two,
however, has given rise to conflicts in decision with the weight
of authority sustaining negotiability where the operation of
the clause depends upon the occurrence of an event bearing a
close relation to the problems of collection55 On the other
hand, a clause giving the holder the option to mature the in-
strument when he "deems himself insecure" has been held to
destroy negotiability5 6 Clearly, both uncertainty in amount
and indefiniteness as to time enter into the problem and Ar-
ticle 3 settles the question by permitting all types of accelera-
tion. The justification for this view is that since demand in-
51 N.D. Rev. Code 141-0204 (3) (1943).
52 "It is usually said that, in order to make an instrument negotiable under
the law merchant, the time of payment must be certain. But a note payable on
or before a certain date is negotiable. The maker of such a note has the right
to pay before the date named, but the holder cannot demand payment before
that date." Spalding, J., in First National Bank v. Buttery, 17 N.D. 326, 116
N.W. 341 (1908).
53 Hollinshead v. John Stuart & Co., 8 N.D. 35, 77 N.W. 89 (1898).
54 Cedar Rapids National Bank v. Snoozy, 55 N.D. 655, 215 N.W. 96 (1927).
55 See Chafee, Acceleration Provisions in Time Paper, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 747
(1919); Britton, Bills and Notes 101 (1943).
5s First State Bank of Cheyenne v. Barton, 129 Okla. 67, 263 Pac. 142 (1928);
Puget Sound State Bank v. Washington Paving Co., 94 Wash. 504, 162 Pac. 870
(1917).
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struments are accelerable at the option of either party, un-
certainties as to time and amount are no more objectionable
where a time instrument is involved. In fact the latter in-
strument, having an ultimate due date, is least objectionable
on this count. To guard against abuse of discretion by the
holder the Code provides as follows:
"A term providing that one party may accelerate payment
or performance or require collateral or additional collateral
not on stated contingencies but 'at will' or 'when he deems him-
self insecure' or in words of similar import means that he has
power to do so only in the good faith belief that the prospect
of payment or performance is impaired but the burden of
establishing lack of good faith is on the party against whom
the power is to be exercised." 57
Extension clauses bear a close relationship to acceleration.
A note may be made payable two years after date, with an op-
tion in the maker to pay on or before that date. The same
transaction might be handled by making the note payable
one year from date, with an option in the maker to extend
the time of payment one year. Both should be negotiable. On
the other hand, a note which gives an option to the maker to
renew at will for an indefinite period would clearly violate
the rule as to certainty of time. Hence the section in question
provides that an extension to a further definite time at the
option of the maker or automatically upon a specified act or
event will not make the time of payment indefinite. Where the
extension is at the option of the holder a later section provides:
"Notwithstanding any term of the instrument, the holder may
extend it only with the consent of the maker at the time of
extension. Unless otherwise specified consent to extension
authorizes a single extension for not longer than the original
period." 51
In brief, the purpose of the section is to clear away un-
certainties under the N.I.L. relating to acceleration and ex-
tension clauses and eliminate objectionable instruments that
do not in fact have free circulation in commerce.
PAYABLE TO ORDER
Section 8 of the N.I.L. concludes: "Where the instrument is
payable to order the payee must be named or otherwise indi-
a? U.C.C. 11-208.
5 81d. §3-119 (b).
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cated therein with reasonable certainty." 59 This language is
eliminated as inconsistent with the new section which permits
an instrument to be made payable to "an estate, trust, fund,
partnership, or unincorporated association." or "an office
or officer as such." so Clearly, such instruments are not in-
tended to be payable to bearer. The section recognizes that
people are not exact in drafting their instruments, and that
all that is required is that the payee be capable of identifica-
tion. Thus an instrument payable to the order of the X Build-
ing Fund may be cashed or negotiated by any person author-
ized to hold the instrument in behalf of the X Building Fund.
Nor is it essential that the payee be a legal entity to bring
the principle into operation. The same is true where the in-
strument is payable to an officer or the office itself. Either the
incumbent or his successors may negotiate, transfer, or dis-
charge the instrument.6 '
The Code reverses cases such as Nelson v. Citizens' Bank,
e2
where a certificate of deposit was held payable to order by
implication arising from the phrase "on return of this certi-
ficate properly indorsed."
The concluding clause covers the case where the instrument
is payable both to order and to bearer. The assumption is that
the order should control because a specific payee is named.
That assumption is overcome, however, where the bearer
words are handwritten or typewritten.
An important change results from the elimination of the
reference to joint payees in §8 of the N.I.L.63 The practice
of making instruments payable to A and B has nothing to do
with survivorship in the absence of express language to that
59 N.D. Rev. Code §41-0208 (1943).
6o U.C.C. §3-110 (e) (f).
61 "An instrument made payable to a named person with the addition of words
describing him
(a) as agent or officer of a specified person is payable to his principal
but the agent or officer may act as if he were the holder;
(b) as any other fiduciary for a specified person or purpose is payable
to the payee and may be negotiated, discharged or enforced by him;
(c) in any other manner is payable to the payee unconditionally and
the additional words are without effect on subsequent parties."
U.C.C. §3-118.
62 191 App. Div. 19, 180 N.Y.Supp. 747 (1920).
68N. D. Rev. Code §41-0208 (4) (1943).
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effect. Hence the change in language makes A and B tenants in
common.6 4 The rule as to indorsement remains the same.65
PAYABLE TO BEARER
The important change here is the elimination of §9 (3) and
(5) of the N.I.L16 Subsection three is dealt with under the
subject of imposters, 7 where a new approach to the subject
has been adopted. Subsection five is dealt with under the sub-
ject of indorsement, where it properly belongs.6s The import
of the section is to make it clear that a bearer instrument is
not intended in any case where an identifiable payee is named.
On the other hand, a blank instrument is not a bearer instru-
ment, but rather an incomplete one that can be filled up by the
holder. The section must be construed in the light of the sec-
tion immediately preceding it.
TERMS AND OMISSIONS NOT AFFECTING NEGOTIABILITY
The substance of the material in §§5 69 and 6 -- of the N.I.L.
are set out in this section. Subsection four of section five is
omitted because it was not desirable to give the holder an op-
tion to require something to be done in lieu of the payment of
money. Such provisions might be proper in investment paper
but are unusual in commercial paper. Subsection four and
five of section six are also omitted. The first deals with the
effect ofa seal. The Code now provides: "An instrument other-
wise negotiable is within this Article even though it is under
seal." 71 The purpose is to make clear that sealed instruments
are on the same footing as other instruments under Article 3.
Subsection five is now covered by the section on Money, dis-
cussed supra.
64 "It may be payable to the order of ... (d) two or more payees together or
in the alternative; . . ."
O5 "An instrument payable to the order of two or more persons
(a) if in the alternative is payable to any one of them and may be
negotiated, discharged or enforced by any of them who has pos-
session of it;
(b) if not in the alternative is payable to all of them and may be
negotiated, discharged or enforced only by all of them." U.C.C.
13-117.
66"The instrument is payable to bearer: (3) When it is payable to the order
of a fictitious or nonexisting person, and such fact was known to the person
making it so payable; or . . . (5) When the only or last endorsement is an en-
dorsement in blank." N.D. Rev. Code §41-0209 (1943).
67 U.C.C. §3-405, to be discussed later
68 Id. §3-204, to be discussed later.
69 N.D. Rev. Code §41-0205 (1943).
70 Id. §41-0206.
71 U.C.C. §3-113.
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The provisions in the N.I.L. regarding collateral have been
broadened. Under this section a clause authorizing the sale
of collateral is no longer limited to default at maturity, but
covers any default in principal or interest, Tying the section
in with the provisions on acceleration, it is now possible to
include a clause covering a demand for additional collateral.
Apparently the original act by implication would not permit
the addition of such a clause. It is included here to conform
with banking practice. The common practice of including a
term in a draft that the indorser acknowledges full satisfac-
tion by indorsing or cashing is now expressly authorized.
The provisions of this section are to be read in the light of
the provisions of the section on form. "Any writing to be
a negotiable instrument within this Article must (b) contain
an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in
money and no ,other promise, order, obligation or power given
by the maker or drawer except as authorized by this Ar-
ticle.." T2
TERMS LIMITING VALIDITY OR TIME OF PRESENTMENT
The material covered in this section is new. The insertion
of a clause requiring that an instrument be presented for pay-
ment within a set period of time is resorted to in cases where a
large number of checks are issued at regular intervals. The
purpose of the clause is to %induce prompt presentment, thus
enabling the drawer to clear his records periodically. Such
a clause should not be effective to protect the drawer from
liability either on the draft or on the debt. The statute pro-
vides that "Such a term in a check is effective only as a direc-
tion to stop payment . . ." It will so operate only if conspi-
cuously placed in the instrument. It does not affect nego-
tiability, and the drawer's contract remains unchanged unless
he signs "without recourse." Is
DATE, ANTEDATING, POSTDATING
Article 3 brings together in this section isolated provisions
of the N.I.L. which deal with the general topic of dates. Thus
§6 (1) of the N.I.L.7' states that the validity and negotiability
of an instrument is not affected by lack of a date. Section 11
721d. §3-104 (1).
73 Id. §3-114.
74 N.D. Rev. Code §41-0206 (1) (1943).
75 Id. §41-0211.
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makes any date presumptively correct. Section 12 " permits
both ante and postdating if no illegal or fraudulent purpose
is involved. 'Section 17 (3) " states that an undated instru-
ment is to be treated as if it bore the date of issuance.
Since dating does not affect negotiability of an instrument,
the reference to fraud or illegality has been eliminated. Fraud-
ulent or illegal dating is not a special kind of fraud and would
be a matter of defense.
The section undertakes to fix the time of payment of ante
and postdated instruments. If payable at a fixed period after
date, the date on the instrument will govern maturity and
it thus becomes possible in the case of an antedated instru-
ment that it will be overdue before it is issued. It is of interest
to note that the present law would give indorsers of an over-
due instrument the right to require presentment and notice
of nonpayment. 7 The Code reverses this rule and delay would
not discharge secondary parties.7 9 The dated demand instru-
ment is payable either on the stated date or the date of issue,
whichever is later. The sentence harmonizes with the conclud-
ing section on form: "A cause of action against the maker of
a note payable on demand accrues upon its issue, or if post-
dated upon the stated date..." 10
The problem of the undated instrument requires mention
here. A demand note bearing no date of issue may or may
not be an incomplete instrument. If no space is left to be
filled, a date is not necessary either under the N.I.L. or Ar-
ticle 3. An undated instrument payable at a fixed period
after date is obviously an incomplete instrument and does
nof fall under this section.
INCOMPLETE INSTRUMENTS
The substance of §§14 81 and 15 82 of the N.I.L. have been
telescoped into two sentences in Article 3. Section 13 83 has
been eliminated since omission of a date needs no special treat-
ment. If an instrument is undated, it may nevertheless be a
76 Id. §41-0212.
77Id. §41-0217 (3).
78Where an instrument-is issued, accepted, or endorsed when overdue, it is,
as regards the person so issuing, accepting, or endorsing it, payable on demand."
N.I.L. 7, N.D. Rev. Code §41-0207 (1943). See note 47 supra.
79 U.C.C. §3-502, to be discussed later.
s0 ld. §3-123.
81 N.D. Rev. Code §41-0214 (1943).
s2 Id. §41-1215.
8 Id. §41-0213.
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complete instrument if no space is left for a date and it is
payable on demand.
The central idea in the section is that an unauthorized com-
pletion of an instrument is a material alteration, and is gov-
erned as such. Under the new section this holds true although
the incomplete instrument was stolen and filled in. Thus, §15
of the N.I.L., making nondelivery of an incomplete instrument
a real defense, has been reversed. The justification for the
change hes in the fact that the holder takes the instrument in
reliance on the genuine signature, whether the instrument
was stolen or delivered. The policy is in line with cases hold-
ing that the drawer of a blank check is estopped to set'up
nondelivery as a defense. 84 As a common law matter, non-
delivery of an instrument whether complete or not was treated
as a real defense.8 5 However, in this country there were de-cisions that nondelivery of a complete instrument could not be
set up against a holder in due course, and this rule was adopted
by the N.I.L., but the original common law viewpoint was re-
tained as to nondelivery of an incomplete instrument. It
would have been more consistent for the drafters of the N.I.L.
to have rejected' the common law view as to nondelivery as to
both complete and incomplete instruments. As the law now
stands, nondelivery of a complete instrument is a personal de-
fense as is unauthorized completion of a delivered instrument.
Where there is both nondelivery and unauthorized comple-
tion, the result should be the same.
INSTRUMENTS PAYABLE WITH WORDS OF DESCRIPTION
Section 42 of the N.I.L. provides: "Where an instrument
is drawn or indorsed to a person as 'Cashier' or other fiscal
officer of a bank or corporation, it is deemed prima facie to be
payable to the bank or corporation.., and may be negotiated
by either.... 86
This section 87 extends the policy of §42 to cover all payees.
The purpose of the drawer is not mere identification of the
payee; he intends the instrument to be payable to the princi-
pal, and names an officer or agent to enable the latter to cash
84 Heimberg v. Lincoln Nat. Bank, 113 N.J.L. 76, 172 Atl. 528 (1934); N.P.
Ry. v. Spokane Valley Growers' Union, 132 Wash. 607, 232 Pac. 691 (1925). Cf.
Linick v. Nutting & Co., 140 App. Div. 265, 125 N.Y.Supp. 93 (1910).
85 Britton, Bills and Notes 344 (1943).
88 N.D. Rev. Code 141-0413 (1943).
87 U.C.C. 3-118.
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the check. The act covers descriptions such as: "John Doe,
Agent Baseball Association of Grafton," "John Doe, Adminis-
trator of estate of Bill Smith, .... John Doe, City Treasurer."
Of course, if no principal is disclosed, the instrument is pay-
able to the named payee.8 8 This extension of the principle
of §42 appears to be sound and requires no modification of
other sections of the N.I.L. relating to defenses and rights
of a holder in due course.
AMBIGUOUS TERMS AND RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
The substance of §17 89 is carried forward in this section.
The omission of subdivisions three 90 and six 91 results from
their treatment in other portions of the Code. The section
seems self-explanatory, its purpose being to prevent resort
to parol evidence to vary the terms of the instrument.92
OTHER WRITINGS AFFECTING THE INSTRUMENT
The N.I.L. contains no provisions which deal with the
effect of a collateral contract on the rights of a holder who
takes the contract by assignment, or has notice of its term
when the instrument is transferred to him. Under the terms
of the N.I.L. there are two situations in which a term of a
88"An instrument made payable to a named person with the addition of
words describing him .. . (c) in any other manner is payable to the payee un-
conditionally and the additional words are without effect on subsequent parties."
U.C.C. 13-118.
s9N.D. Rev. Code 141-0217 (1943).
90 "Where the instrument is not dated, it will be considered to be dated as of
the time it was issued." N.D. Rev. Code §41-0217 (3) (1943).
91 "Where a signature is so placed upon the instrument that it is not clear
in what capacity the person making the same intended to sign, he is to be
deemed an indorser; . . ." N.D. Rev. Code §41-0217 (6) (1943).
92 "The following rules apply to every instrument:
(a) Where there is doubt whether the instrument is a draft or a note
the holder may treat it as either. A draft drawn on the drawer is
effective as a note.
(b) Handwritten terms control typewritten and printed terms, and
typewritten control printed.
(c) Words control figures except that if the words are ambiguous fig-
ures control.
(d) Unless otherwise specified a provision for interest means Interest
at the legal rate at the place of payment from the date of the in-
strument, or if it is undated from the date of issue.
(e) Unless the instrument otherwise specifies two or more persons
who sign in the same capacity and as a part of the same transaction
are jointly and severally liable even though the instrument con-
tains such words as 'I promise to pay.'
(f) Nothwithstanding any term of the instrument, the holder may
extend it only with the' consent of the maker at the time of
extension. Unless otherwise specified consent to extension author-
izes a single extension for not longer than the original period."
U.C.C. §3-119.
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negotiable instrument may be incorporated in a separate in-
strument. Section 31 98 permits indorsement on a separate
piece of paper when the back of the instrument is filled up,
provided the paper is attached to the instrument.. Sections
134 and 135 94 cover acceptances of existing and future in-
struments on separate writings. Aside from these two cases,
unless the terms of the note are expressly conditioned on a
contemporaneous agreement, the weight of authority is that
the terms of a note cannot be varied by provisions in contem-
poraneous contracts for the purpose of destroying negotia-
bility. The principle is illustrated by the mortgage cases which
refuse to permit acceleration of a note unless the note itself
so provides. 95 On the other hand, it is not at all clear that
this view should prevail where the mortgage clause purports
to govern the note. The problem is forcibly illustrated by the
facts in National Bank of Watervliet v. Martin," where a
note for $7,500 was issued together with a collateral writing
which provided for periodic renewal of the note on payment
cf $250 installments. The court permitted recovery on the
face of the note, despite the fact that the assignee of the con-
tract expressly agreed to be bound by its terms and conditions.
It seems more sensible to hold that the transferee was a holder
in due course, but took subject to the renewal provisions of
which he had notice. To permit the holder to disregard the pro-
visions as to renewal might cause the maker great hardship,
and the decision could not be upheld under the U.C.C. This
section applies to negotiable instruments the general rule that
applies in other branches of contract law that contemporaneous
writings are to be read together when they constitute part of
a single transaction. 7 It is not intended to mean that clauses in
the contemporaneous writings are always read into the note.
93 N.D. Rev. Code §41-0402 (1943).
94 Id. 1141-1103, 41-1104.
95 Baird v. Meyer, 55 N.D. 930, 215 N.W. 542 (1927).
9203 App. Div. 390, 196 N.Y.Supp. 714 (1922), aff'd, 235 N.Y. 611, 139 N.E.
755 (1923).
97 "(1) As between the obligor and his immediate obligee or any transferee
the terms of an instrument may be modified or affected by any other written
agreement executed as a part of the same transaction, except that
(a) A transferee to whom the other agreement is not assigned acquires
no rights under it except as a transferee; and ...
(c) A holder in due course is not affected by any limitation of his
rights arising out of the separate agreement if he had no notice
of it when he took the instrument.
"(2) A separate written agreement does not affect the negotiability of an
instrument." U.C.C. §3-120.
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Such a construction could not be sustained since it would render
many instruments nonnegotiable. As indicated above, whether
or not an acceleration clause in a mortgage affects the rights
of a holder depends upon the intention of the parties as ex-
pressed in the mortgage, and whether the holder took with
notice.
A special problem will arise where the terms of the instru-
ment and those of the accompanying contract are not consist-
ent. Thus if the mortgage fixes the debt at $4,000 and the note
at $3,500, the answer appears to be that the note shouldgovern, since we treat the mortgage as incidental. 98
While there is a substantial body of authority favoring the
view that defenses should be let in where finance houses, oper-
ating in connection with sales agencies, take the contract and
note as a step in completing the sale;99 the present statute
would appear to compel a contrary result, at least where a
separate legal entity is set up to handle financing. As a mat-
ter of policy no solution is offered to this problem in Article
3. This section simply establishes the negotiability of an in-
strument accompanied by security. Since the holder taking
without assignment is the owner of the security, whether or
not a formal assignment is executed, it is difficult to see why a
holder who takes by assignment should be in a worse position.
In conclusion, this section will definitely compel reading the
note, draft, or other instrument, together with any collateral
contract. The result is not to render the instrument nonnego-
tiable unless the writing contains a limitation constituting a
defense. Thus a provision in the writing to the effect that the
note shall be nonnegotiable would prevent any holder who
had notice of the provision from enforcing the note. On the
other hand, if the collateral writing contains an acceleration
or other clause which would not affect the negotiability of the
note if included among its provisions, a holder without notice
would take free of the clause, but one who took with notice
will nonetheless be a holder in due course, subject to the rights
created in the obligor by the terms of the writing.
INSTRUMENTS PAYABLE THROUGH OR AT A BANK
Many institutions issue payroll, dividend and other checks
payable through a particular bank. This section is new, and
98 Brynjolfson v. Osthus, 12 N.D. 42, 96 N.W. 261 (1903).
99 Palmer, Negotiable Instruments Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 48
Mich.L.Rev. 255, 269, and n. 49,51 (1950).
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makes it clear that such a direction or order does not make the
bank a drawee, nor compel it to accept the instrument for col-
lection in the absence of an agreement with the drawer to that
effect' 00 This appears to conform with commercial under-
standing and practice.
On the other hand, where the instrument is payable "at"
a bank, the practice in banking and commercial circles is not
uniform. Section 87 of the N.I.L. provides:
"Where an instrument is made payable at a bank it is equi-
valent to an order to the bank to pay the same for the account
of the principal debtor thereon."
The omission of this section in the North Dakota Code is
suggestive of the conflict in practice throughout the country.
The N.I.L. rule was presumably based on a New York prac-
tice of treating such an instrument as the equivalent of a
check. The rule was followed in neighboring states but ap-
pears to havebeen rejected by the southern and western states.
The prevailing view in the west is that such a provision creates
a mere agency. The bank notifies the drawer, but is not auth-
orized to charge the account of the drawer without his con-
sent. The section is proposed in alternative forms to fit the
practice in each state. To require uniformity in this instance
would upset long established practices and might do more
harm than good. 110
ACCRUAL OF CAUSE OF ACTION
This is the concluding section in Part I on Form and Inter-
pretation, and deals with a subject touched on indirectly in
the N.I.L. Under §192 of the original act,10 2 the person pri-
marily liable was the one required to pay by the terms of the
instrument. Sections 60 log and 62 104 made the maker and the
100 "An instrument which states that it is 'payable through' a bank or the
like designates that bank as a collecting bank to make presentment but unless
otherwise agreed neither authorizes the bank to pay the instrument nor re-
quires the bank to collect it." U.C.C. 33-121.
101 "Alternative A -
"A note or acceptance which states that it is payable at a bank is the equi-
valent of a bill drawn on the bank payable when it falls due out of any funds
of the maker or acceptor in current account or otherwise available for such
payment.
"Alternative B
"A note or acceptance which states that it is payable at a bank is not of itself
an order or authorization to the bank to pay it." U.C.C. 13-122.
102 N.D. Rev. Code 141-0103 (1943).
10 Id. 141-0601.
104 Id. 141-0603.
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acceptor primary parties who engaged to pay the instrument.
Under §70,105 presentment was not necessary to charge pri-
mary parties, but was required to charge the drawer and in-
dorsers. Thus a clear line is drawn in the N.I.L. between pri-
mary and secondary parties as to the accrual of a cause of
action.
Dealing first with the liability of primary parties, in the
case of a time instrument the statute of limitations ran from
the maturity date. In demand instruments the date of issue
was the maturity date, unless the instrument were post-
dated. 106 The principle is the familiar one applied at common
law on a simple contract claim that demand is not a condition
precedent to suit. However, certain exceptions grew up in
connection with banking transactions. The reason for these
exceptions seems to lie in the peculiar relationship created
when a bank accepts a deposit or borrows money on its certi-
ficate of deposit. A banker ordinarily expects to pay on de-
mand. The establishment of a checking account illustrates
the point nicely. The deposit creates a debtor-creditor rela-
tionship, but the contract of the bank is to pay only on de-
mand, and hence the statute of limitations runs against the
depositor only from the date of demand. 10
While a certificate of deposit is a promissory note issued by
a bank, and the bank is primarily liable as maker, the courts
have held the statute ran only from the date of demand, and
this is the point of view adopted by Article 3, because it ac-
cords with commercial understanding and practice. 08
The position of the acceptor of a demand instrument is un-
usual in that the holder is entitled to payment, not acceptance.
When does the statute of limitations run against the liability
of the acceptor on a demand instrument? In the case of a
certified check the cases have held that the statute ran from
the date of demand 100 by analogy to the cases on certificates
of deposit. No good reason exists why the same rule should
not apply to the acceptance of an ordinary demand instrument.
By presenting the instrument for acceptance the holder has
105 Id. §41-0701.
106 McAdam v. Grand Forks Mercantile Co., 24 N.D. 645, 140 N.W. 725 (1913).
10T For special legislation apparently setting up a short statute of limitations
in favor of the bank, see N.D. Rev. Code §6-0824 (Supp. 1949).
108 Dean v. Iowa-Des Moines National Bank, 227 Iowa 1239, 290 N.W. 664
(1940).
109 See note 106 supra.
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asked for a new contract with the drawee, and one that he is
not entitled to as a matter of right. The promise of the ac-
ceptor in such a case is to pay on presentment of the instru-
ment, i.e., on demand. Thus the proposed section provides:
"A cause of action ... against the ... acceptor of an instru-
ment payable on demand does not accrue until demand . . ." 11
The drawer, on the other hand, is secondarily liable. Under
§61 of the N.I.L.,"' he engages that he will pay the instrument
if duly presented for payment and payment is refused, pro-
vided the proper steps are taken to notify him of this fact.
Prima facie, it would be reasonable to assume that since the
drawer is discharged unless proper presentment is made or
excused, and demand being a condition precedent to accrual
of a cause of action, that the statute of limitations would run
from the date of demand. The cases, however, treat the prob-
lem raised by the statute of limitations as a distinct problem
and hold that while a cause of action accrues on demand, the
statute runs from a reasonable time after the date of issue.112
The present section adopts the logical view that the cause of
action accrues upon demand, and apparently the statute of
limitations would run against the liability of the drawer from
that date. If presentment were delayed and not excused of
course the drawer is discharged.
In conclusion, the present section attempts to codify exist-
ing case law on accrual of a cause of action. The implication
is that since a cause of action accrues at times set in the




111 N.D. Rev. Code §41-0602 (1943).
112 See note 107 supra.
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